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ABSTRACT: What if deconstruction were as dangerous as its critics make it out to be? 
What if we actually advanced a more destructive deconstruction? In a world torn apart 
by various crises, what is required is a stronger, more ambitious deconstruction that 
moves beyond softer, descriptive versions (Derrida‟s, Caputo‟s, etc.). I propose a more 
ruthless deconstruction, one that is unashamed to “slay monsters” (Caputo‟s words), 
especially the monster-traditions of Church, Capital, and “Democracy.” I begin by 
noting the significance and relevance of deconstruction during the present, a time of 
“revolutionary stirring.” I then focus on Derrida‟s statement that he is “a very 
conservative person,” a remark unsatisfactorily explored by Caputo. I then show how 
Caputo‟s construal of traditions in this text is extremely problematic. However, his later 
thinking shows signs of a more radical deconstructive bent, one which leads downs the 
roads of revolution and communism (“a radical community of equals”).    
/// 
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I wish deconstruction were as dangerous as its critics have made it out to be. After all, in 
its existing configurations (Derridean, Caputocean, Hägglundian, etc.), it is not very 
dangerous. More bark than bite, really. But why do I desire a more destructive 
deconstruction? The answer is surely obvious: amidst the ecological, economic, ethical, 
and other crises, what we desperately require is radical global transformation – i.e. 
Revolution – and my contention is that deconstruction – a more destructive 
form/version of deconstruction – would be a powerful resource in our fight against the 
powerful, which shall entail much destruction, obviously followed by deconstructive 
construction and re-construction. To destroy – to obliterate ethically – is a daunting task, 
of course, but necessary, given what is at stake. Hence, my desire for a dangerous 
deconstruction. In other words, an ethico-politically prescriptive deconstruction, a 
world-transformative deconstruction.      
 
Deconstruction in a Time of Revolutionary Stirring 
Deconstruction is certainly an unsettling force, upsetting almost everyone who comes 
across it, given its uncompromising questioning of our received notions. It has been 
causing a bit of a stir in academia for a number of decades now: but is academia a true 
measure of its radicality? That the word „deconstruction‟ has made its way into popular 
culture and dinner party conversation does not signal its ethico-political subversiveness 
but rather its misappropriation. Indeed, perhaps its co-option is just another brilliant 
example of the way in which capitalist „democracy‟ subsumes any and all radical forces, 
real or imaginary. Even deconstruction‟s latest guise, brilliantly refigured by Martin 
Hägglund (2008) as a cold-hearted descriptivism is not really dangerous, precisely 
because it “returns” deconstruction to the task of description. 
Deconstruction‟s ethico-political impotence has perhaps become more visible in 
the past decade or so, in the context of the return (or return to prominence) of radical 
political thought, primarily advanced by the likes of Antonio Negri, Alain Badiou, and 
perhaps most influentially, Slavoj Žižek (refer to, e.g., Hardt and Negri, 2000; Badiou, 
2010; Žižek, 2008). Of course, world events – from an awareness of the 
possibility/probability of human-induced climate change to the economic crises in the 
USA and Europe to the „Arab Spring‟ to the „Occupy‟ movement – have perhaps made 
the rest of us more open to the very ideas of „ideology‟ and „utopianism‟ and „revolution‟ 
and „communism‟ – words many of us assumed were dead. In such a time of rising 
ecological-political consciousness and the serious questioning and rejection of existing 
systems and structures, should not deconstruction be involved? Could not 
deconstruction – or at least one version or revision of it – contribute to the task of 
thinking the Revolution? 
My thesis here is that deconstruction could be involved in the Revolution – but 
perhaps only a deconstruction with a radical core, fortified, strengthened. In other 
words, it is time that, rather than figuring deconstruction as an incisive but ultimately 
soft force, one which was content to „unpack‟ texts or read them „against the grain‟ in 
civilized, sophisticated, and nuanced ways – which is vital, up to a point, but can also 
lead to obscurantism, quietism, apoliticism – I contend that it is time we should now 
insist on deconstruction‟s destructiveness; that we should now unashamedly insist on a 
more ruthless de-construction, a neo-deconstruction. To promote and advance a more 
potent deconstruction, one that will help us fight the Good Fight rather than hyper-
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problematize or obscure the task in front of us, before us. For deconstruction (or 
something like it) is such a potent tool, and like all good tools – hammers, crowbars, etc. 
– a reinforced deconstructive thinking has the potential to be a powerful weapon in our 
struggle for thinking, implementing, and operating the Revolution we need, now.  
 
 
Soft Deconstructions 
Jacques Derrida: “I am a very conservative person” 
 
If Jacques Derrida was a conservative person, then how should we understand the 
relation between his conservatism and his configuration of deconstruction? But first: 
was Derrida conservative? It appears so: he himself proclaimed his conservatism. The 
context was a 1994 Roundtable discussion between Derrida and a number of Villanova 
Univesity academics, of which Deconstruction in a Nutshell (1997) was the result (and what 
makes this text fascinating, apart from the fact that it is an the exceptionally accessible 
work, is that deconstruction‟s subversive core rears its head in the very same work, a 
point to which I shall return). During the exchange, whilst speaking of his involvement 
in the establishment of the International College of Philosophy and the desire to 
inaugurate something new whilst maintaining elements of older institutions, Derrida 
declares: “So, you see, I am a very conservative person” (1997: 8).  
To be sure, multiple comments and provisos are required here. First of all, 
Derrida is French, and the French (and not just the French) love to shock, so perhaps 
this comment should not be taken too seriously. After all, Derrida is playful, a 
provocateur, which is characteristic of the greatest thinkers. (Nietzsche immediately 
comes to mind.) But let us nevertheless assume that there is a measure of truth in this 
comment, that we take on his word i.e. that Derrida is indeed a “very conservative 
person.” Derrida is referring to himself, to his personhood in contradistinction to his 
philosophy or to his explication of a thinking he calls „deconstruction.‟ In other words, 
Derrida may have been a very conservative person (we could also perhaps note that he 
was married, a parent, an academic, etc. – which of course does not necessarily entail 
conservatism) whilst deconstruction is not – or at least “not very conservative.” (Once 
again, Nietzsche – radical thinker and rather conservative person – comes to mind.) 
Derrida may be said to embody the „both-and‟ of the deconstructive logic he advances: 
simultaneously a conservative person and a radical thinker; perhaps more accurately: 
“one and the same” person may be both conservative and radical i.e. that, in certain 
aspects, one is conservative, and in others, radical. Furthermore, we may propose that 
Derrida was a thinker who realized that what he was doing was describing, not prescribing, 
and certainly not prescribing anything radical.  
And yet, even when taking all these factors into account (hyperbole, 
distinguishing between the man and his thought, the multiplicity in subjectivity, 
deconstruction-as-description), we are indeed “surprised” by such a 
declaration/confession, as Caputo rightly notes (1997: 37). I propose that we are 
surprised – even shocked – precisely because the harbinger of such a radical philosophy 
would be expected to be a radical person or at least unconservative or at least only 
somewhat/slightly conservative. But to be very conservative? – yes, quite/very surprising, 
even shocking (perhaps something he wanted to achieve, considering he was a very 
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cheeky thinker). And anyway, Derrida never really came across as a revolutionary, as 
someone who wanted to tear up the system and start again, as someone deeply driven by 
the recognition that the world is in desperate need of radical change (even with a 
publication like 1994‟s Specters of Marx), so we should not be too surprised or shocked. 
But we – we desirers of a new society – cannot help but be at least a little bit surprised, 
perhaps even shocked. Most certainly: disappointed.  
Apart from my citation of possible explanations for Derrida‟s declaration of 
conservatism, Caputo provides a further exposition. But before he does so, he provides 
the following explication in relation to the context of the Roundtable: “Derrida was 
trying to persuade us [i.e. those gathered at a Roundtable at Villanova University 
addressed by Derrida] that deconstruction is on our side, that it means to be good news, 
and that it does not leave behind a path of destruction and smoldering embers [emphasis added]” 
(1997: 37). Before moving on to a discussion of several elements of this comment, I 
should first mention something about the form of this remark: I propose that this is a 
kind of assurance, one that uses particularly evocative language, which is perhaps 
necessary, given that Caputo is leading up to an explication of Derrida‟s surprising claim 
or declaration of conservatism. After all, Caputo insists that deconstruction is not “a 
form of conservativism,” something with which, incidentally, “he [Derrida] is also 
accused of” (1997: 38). So we can already perceive that deconstruction is often 
construed as something that either destroys or conserves. (And my claim, of course, is 
that it should be something that is unashamedly destructive.) 
Now, in relation to the content of this quoted piece, we could ask the following 
questions: On whose side is deconstruction? Given the particular context of the text, is it 
on the side of Villanova‟s academics? One hopes that it is on the side of academics who 
question and critique our prevailing beliefs, actions, and institutions, particularly those 
that oppress. But are not academics and academia on the side of the establishment, of the 
status quo? The same may be asked of deconstruction‟s “good news”: is it good news 
for the powerless or the powerful? Of course, one anticipates that deconstruction 
might/would feel uneasy responding to this kind of „either/or‟ questioning, but this line 
of enquiry remains pertinent, and certainly informs the present work. The final part of 
the quotation is italicized because, as you may begin to imagine, it is precisely a 
deconstruction which leaves behind a path of destruction which I am advancing here, 
and one to which I shall return in due course.  
 
Caputo on Tradition(/s) 
Caputo goes on to explain that Derrida has a nuanced approach to “tradition” – which 
is, one may fairly say, the very stuff of conservatism, conservatism‟s home and vehicle – 
but what Derrida purportedly attempts to do with tradition is to:  
 
unfold what has been folder over by and in the tradition, to show the pliant multiplicity of the 
innumerable traditions that are sheltered within „tradition.‟ A tradition is not a hammer with 
which to slam dissent and knock dissenters senseless, but a responsibility to read, to interpret, to 
sift and select responsibly among many competing strands of tradition and interpretations of 
tradition (Caputo, 1997: 37). 
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Let us pause once again to analyze some of the sentiments contained in this passage. 
First of all, the word “sheltered” is revealing: this word implies safety, of keeping safe, of 
self-insulation: Caputo‟s (implicit) contention is that traditions “shelter” innumerable 
traditions within them. But is that really the case? Do not traditions try their damndest 
to do the opposite: rather than shelter alternative voices, they seek to drive them out or 
silence them („silence‟ in both senses)? Rather than sheltering alternative or heretical 
traditions, dominant traditions attempt to – and often spectacularly succeed in – 
destroying them. Furthermore, a „tradition‟ in the Derridean-deconstructive sense may 
theoretically not be “a hammer with which to slam dissent and knock dissenters 
senseless,” but that is certainly how dominant traditions have remained dominant.  
With typical nuance and subtlety, Caputo then makes the following remark: “For 
he [Derrida] sees deconstruction as a way to keep the event of tradition going, to keep it 
on the move, so that it can be continually translated into new events, continually 
exposed to a certain revolution in a self-perpetuating auto-revolution” (1997: 37). 
Caputo goes on to state that “That is an aporia that conservatimism can never swallow” 
– and something, perhaps, that we cannot swallow either: is not Caputo being too 
gracious to tradition/s, giving them too much benefit of the doubt? That traditions “can 
be” continually translated, that they can be auto-revolutionizing? And when a tradition is 
“auto-revolutionary,” how revolutionary can it be? Can there even be “auto-revolution”? 
Is not a “tradition” precisely that which resists self-revision? There may be a certain 
degree of alteration going on in our traditions, but should not such adjustments be 
deemed merely self-adjusting rather than auto-revolutionizing?  
If history/histories has taught us anything, it is this: that it is much more often the 
case that traditions hold on for their dear life, that their keepers threaten, injure, or kill 
those who question them or dare to destroy the traditions that oppress the weak. Is not 
a tradition, by definition, that which seeks to hold onto itself despite the forces of time, 
rationality, knowledge, openness, progressiveness? Is it not the case that dominant 
traditions usually only reform in the face of real pressure, real threat? Is not the “event” 
– or at least the most eventful event – precisely that which flies in the face of tradition? 
By employing a somewhat-ambiguous phrase like “event of tradition,” Caputo has 
brought the two terms too close together, whereas I propose that the two are rather 
antithetical, that existing dominant traditions are more often than not the enemy of the event; 
that tradition is hostile to it. In other words, dominant traditions are usually oppressors 
of the event, of events.   
Furthermore and unfortunately, Caputo does not explain what the “certain [kind 
of] revolution” this self-revolution would be: perhaps/probably only a “partial 
revolution”, a revolution-without-revolutrion i.e. not a real revolution, not one that 
radically transfigures the traditions and institutions themselves. What Caputo probably 
has in mind here is reform. (I return to this point below when I discuss Caputo‟s 
advancement of a reformed capitalism.) We are at least grateful that Caputo has 
mentioned the blessed word „revolution‟ – indeed, by employing the phrases “auto-
revolution” and “auto-deconstruction” in close proximity, we may perhaps intuit a 
certain commensurability, compatibility, or symbiosis between the two. But rather than 
emphasize any connectivity between deconstruction and revolution, Caputo dilutes and 
downplays revolution. According to his rendering, revolution is a part of tradition, it 
occurs within tradition, by tradition. For a more destructive 
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deconstruction/deconstructive destruction, however, the reverse is true: revolution 
would annihilate dominant, oppressive traditions; revolution occurs more or less from 
“without,” as an event.  
 
Examples of Monster-Traditions to be Slain  
But one could object that what Caputo is describing here is „tradition‟ as figured by 
Derrida – at least according to Caputo‟s rendering. But Caputo‟s overly optimistic 
rendering is too open, too forgiving. It erroneously expects that dominant traditions will 
change from within – but the historical truth is that this rarely occurs; much more often than 
not, they require external intervention – oftentimes, they require annihilation. 
Derrida‟s/Caputo‟s “bigger, wider, more diffuse and mobile” idea of tradition does not 
help us when dealing with actually existing traditions, with traditions as they actually 
operate – especially dominant traditions. Let us briefly consider examples which Caputo 
himself has discussed (albeit briefly): the Catholic Christian tradition (of course, there are 
also other dominant churches), the economic tradition of capitalism, and “democracy” 
(to come).  
 
1. The Church 
 
When it comes to our biggest and most influential institutions, I contend that there is 
very little – if any – radical self-revising going on; that there is very little – if any – 
change that warrants the beautiful name of „revolution‟ or even of “auto-deconstructing” 
and “auto-revolution.” For example, let us take the Catholic Church (Caputo‟s Church 
tradition). It may be proposed that it has “evolved” in certain ways, with its dogmas and 
practices revised, elaborated, etc. But can we say that it has been truly auto-
deconstructing? One could propose that Vatican II or liberation theology, for example, 
are exemplary auto-revolutionary moments, but how much have they fundamentally 
changed a Church that is fundamentally fundamentalist? To what extent has the Church 
abolished the patriarchy and puritanism that plague it? Does this institution not remain 
dogmatic, sexist, elitist, ritualistic, etc.? If there is a “certain revolution” going on within 
the Catholic Church (and not just the Catholic Church, not just Christian denominations), 
it is not very revolutionary.  
But one could bring to our attention those moments when those inside the 
Catholic Church have conflicted with the institution to such an extent that there is a 
break, the most historically decisive being the Lutheran event. But how revolutionary are 
the ekklesies that arose in the wake of this break? The Lutheran „revolution‟ has generated 
the establishment of other traditions – admittedly, some more “auto-deconstructing” 
than others (such as the Quakers, perhaps) – but these newer traditions maintain many 
of the dogmatisms and oppressive practices with which religious institutions seem 
transfixed. Can we point to a religious tradition that is truly auto-deconstructing? Does 
not history show how stunningly non-auto-deconstructing or even anti-auto-
deconstructing such traditions are? Does not history show their resilience towards any 
kind of positive change? Indeed, can we not explain the hostile reaction to 
deconstruction precisely in terms of the fact that such a philosophy and practice 
threatens the anti-revolutionary drive of our dominant, domineering institutions?  
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Caputo follows his statements on “auto-deconstruction” and “auto-revolution” with a 
certain clarification: “the most fundamental misunderstanding to beset Derrida and 
deconstruction is the mistaken impression that is given of a kind of anarchistic relativism 
in which „anything goes.‟ On this view, texts mean anything the reader wants them to 
mean; traditions are just monsters to be slain or escaped from. . . .” (1997: 37-38). First 
of all, any careful reader of Derrida and his expositors will know that deconstruction is 
anything but an “anything goes” philosophy. The second sentence, on the other hand, is 
particularly useful for us here. To begin with, it would be a gross generalization to 
characterize traditions as “just monsters”: returning to our example of the Catholic 
tradition, one would be irrational in the extreme to describe it as “just a monster.” It has 
some quasi-redeeming qualities, including its transmission of the “Jesus event”: to be 
sure, such a transmission has been fraught with myriad problems (including the 
obsession to secure the truth or meaning of such a perplexing possibility), but we must 
credit such institutions for the transmission, together with the positives such 
transmission has brought (a desire for the divine, a Christic ethos of love and sharing 
and caring and forgiving, etc.). Hence, the Catholic Church (and not just the Catholic 
Church, not just Christian denominations) is not “just” a monster. It has some quasi-
redeeming qualities. But it is a monster nevertheless. For even though it retains some 
quasi-redeeming qualities, the Catholic Church continues to promote its dogmas, 
superstitions, and archaic rituals; it continues to hoard its obscene wealth; it continues to 
exclude females from positions of power; it continues to conceal its sex crimes; and so 
on.  
 
Towards a Truly Deconstructive Faith 
 
What, then, should we do with such a monster? Since, today, we can transmit the “Jesus 
event” in non-dogmatic, non-oppressive ways, more and more of us are “escaping 
from” such traditions (which is the second of Caputo‟s two options, the other being 
slaying such monster-traditions). Such a move may perhaps be considered 
“revolutionary” to a certain extent, albeit at the level of the individual or local; for 
instance, Caputo himself discusses and warmly approves of ways in which some 
Catholics are “churching” differently these days (2006: ch. 6). But such a move should 
only be considered a preliminary move, for the monster remains: the thoroughly 
revolutionary thing to do with such traditions is to slay them, raze them from the face of 
the Earth, not even leaving their embers to smolder. After all, why let the Catholic 
Church live in its present form? If its „core‟ message can be transmitted in ethico-
politically and theologically-spiritually progressive ways, then why let such a tradition 
continue to oppress us? Should not such a monster be slain? Should not all religions of 
oppression be slain? In their stead, there shall be new/ish traditions which are truly auto-
deconstructing and auto-revolutionizing. For they will be open, revisable, minimalist. 
Consequently, these new/ish spiritual traditions will allow self-revision to occurs freely, 
voluntarily, willingly. Such institutions will not be allowed to grow into monsters; they 
themselves will not allow it. And if they do, the ever-vigilant Revolution will slay them. 
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2. Capitalism 
 
Given capitalism‟s rapacious appetite for earthly “resources” and the Earth itself, whose 
“logical” conclusion is accelerated ecological devastation and the specter of human-
induced climate-change; given the ways in which greedy banks and individuals have 
exploited the world, bringing the almighty USA to its economic knees, whilst the likes of 
Greece, Ireland, and other European countries face bankruptcy, one wonders why we 
continue to allow the tradition of capitalism to continue. For its patent devilishness is 
plain for anyone to perceive. But Caputo himself would rather witness its “self-revision” 
than its slaying. He contends: 
  
I would be perfectly happy if the far left politicians in the United States were able to 
reform the system by providing universal health care, effectively redistributing wealth 
more equitably with a revised IRS code, effectively restricting campaign financing, 
enfranchising all voters, treating migrant workers humanely, and effecting a multilateral 
foreign policy that would integrate American power within the international community, 
etc., i.e., intervene upon capitalism by means of serious and far-reaching reforms. . . . If 
after doing all that Badiou and Žižek complained that some Monster called Capital still 
stalks us, I would be inclined to greet that Monster with a yawn (2007: 124-125).  
   
We have an instance here in which Caputo clearly demonstrates his preference to keep 
the tradition-Monster of Capital alive, albeit with major reforms. Rather than 
entertaining the possibility of slaying this tradition, he prefers to re-create it. He does not 
raise or ponder the question as to whether capitalism could or would want to 
incorporate such substantial revisions. In First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (2009), Žižek 
directly addresses Caputo‟s reformed capitalism and asks whether its “particular 
malfunctionings” are “structurally necessary” (2009). It is perhaps worth citing the 
relevant passage here, not only due to its incisive content but its form, for it proceeds 
rather carefully, somewhat modestly, as a series of questions (which is rather 
uncharacteristic of the bombastic Žižek):  
 
“The problem here is not Caputo‟s conclusion that if one can achieve all that within 
capitalism, why not remain within the system? The problem lies with the „utopian‟ 
premise that it is possible to achieve all that within the coordinates of global capitalism. 
What if the particular malfunctionings of capitalism enumerated by Caputo are not 
merely accidental disturbances but are rather structurally necessary? What if Caputo‟s 
dream is a dream of universality (of the universal capitalist order) without its symptoms, 
without any critical points in which its „repressed truth‟ articulates itself?” (2009: 77-78).  
 
Given capitalism‟s greedy, exploitative character, one finds it difficult (though perhaps 
not impossible) to imagine that such a tradition would generate any “auto-
deconstruction” or “auto-revolution” which betters it (unless it pays, perhaps). Such 
resistance is exemplified by the monumental opposition to President Obama‟s 
healthcare reforms – the desire for a free national healthcare system being, to any 
reasonable person, both rational and just. To be sure, Capital is always “revising” itself, 
flexing and adapting in astonishing ways – but for the sake of maintaining and extending 
its greedy grip. Judging by capitalism‟s track record, we should not expect any immediate 
or willing “auto-deconstruction” or “auto-revolution” that leads to society‟s ethico-
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political betterment. Given the planet‟s disfiguration at an alarming rate, can we – not 
just „we‟ humans – afford to wait for positive self-change? Given these objections and 
doubts, one wonders why Caputo would prefer siding with the slight possibility – or 
even impossibility – of capitalism‟s self-overhaul rather than its obliteration, whereby we 
would be given the opportunity to start again, start afresh.  
 
Towards a Truly Deconstructive Neo-Communism 
 
Straightaway, may I underline that I am not an economist, so I am unable to sketch any 
details here of a new/ish economic system that will replace capitalism. However, as a 
thinker, I will contribute whatever I can to its thinking as part of my overall ambition of 
providing/contributing to a blueprint for Revolution (a task that will consume whatever 
remains of my life). And so, I will only mention a few points here. To begin with, what 
would we replace the monster-tradition of capitalism? Is not communism, for example, 
just another monster? What we know for sure is that the Revolutionary economic 
system will be driven by a logic and structure of sharing, of the just distribution of 
wealth, of economic egalitarianism – so, yes, this all sounds like socialism/communism 
(I use the terms „socialism‟ and „communism‟ interchangeably here). Of course, we 
communists are somewhat wary of citing such words and traditions, given their 
monstrous twentieth-century histories (Stalin, Pol Pot, etc.). Really Existing Socialism 
has been Really Disappointing. However, communism‟s gross historical distortions do 
not necessarily entail that it cannot eventually be realized – especially when enlightening 
forces like deconstruction may guide us in its implementation. We must therefore 
consider the possibility of a truer expression of socialism, a „neo-communism‟ that 
finally does justice to the Ideal. (In the same way that the Christic Ideal has been 
corrupted in the form of Christendom but that this does not necessarily entail the 
impossibility of a Revolutionary Christic Faith [non-dogmatic, open, minimalist, etc.], so 
is it possible for there to be a Revolutionary Communism that honors the Communist 
Ideal.)   
Now, just as deconstruction has patiently awaited the likes of Drucilla Cornell in 
terms of applying deconstruction to the law, or Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe‟s 
political adaptation of deconstruction (Caputo, 2007: 123), so, too, we await for radical 
economists to offer their models of a neo-Communist economics. In the meantime, 
what we noneconomists can do is begin to sketch our philosophical – and for some of 
us, our theological –figurations of a neo-Marxist society with as much positive content 
as we can, progressing with the required caution (something deconstruction taught us in 
an exemplary way) as well as the required ardor and ruthlessness. Žižek himself is 
cautiously-prudently-powerfully beginning to sketch his notions of “ethical violence” 
(2004) and agape as “political love” (2010: 98-117), maybe he will offer some (more) 
positive content for our neo-Communism. Ultimately, however, the responsibility falls 
on all of us: what we thinkers must now do is provide the general framework for the 
Revolution, inviting and involving economic, political, and other specialists to provide 
recommendations and details.  
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3. “Democracy” 
 
It is clearly apparent that Really Existing Democracy is neither truly democratic nor 
really working. To be sure, it is far better than the tyrannical regimes that inhabit various 
regions of the Earth. And perhaps when the multitude is truly educated (for today they 
remain uneducated and miseducated, and certainly unenlightened), it could perhaps be 
effective, maybe – but then if the world‟s citizens become schooled in the art of thinking 
during the Revolution, then democracy would be obsolete, for questions of law and 
other social matters would be addressed via the one truly universal force: Reason. A 
Reason/ing that would, of course, be informed by forces such as deconstruction.  
And of course, our construal of Reason is not exactly a hyper-inflated figuration, 
an over-inflated rationalism purportedly advanced by Kant and the Enlightenment (which 
is Caputo‟s framing [1997: 66-67]): this situational-contextual Reason is certainly an open 
one, one which learns from deconstruction and other modes of thinking the art of 
considering its “others” (faith, literature, art, etc.), of being more pasisonate and 
compassionate and forgiving, of being more expansive and imaginative and inventive – 
perhaps more akin to “thinking” or “wisdom” which are more open and expansive than 
any allegedly “narrow” “Reason.” A thinking that is “bigger, wider, more diffuse and 
mobile.” However, this Revolutionary Reason is also “Kantian” and “Enlightenmental” in 
its ambition, in its self-assurance that it should be the principal driver when it comes to 
the compositions and movements of our traditions and institutions. (When glossing 
Kant and the Enlightenment, Caputo remarks: “Kant gives the philosopher a symbolic 
mastery of the world, before which everything must pass in review . . .” [1997: 66-67]. 
But is not at least one reason the world is in a mess precisely because we have irrational 
leaders, irrational forms of government and economics and religions? My contention is 
that the world would certainly not be in any worse shape under the rulership of a council 
of wise people, and with full military might behind them, such a form of governance 
would most likely make the world a better place. In this respect, Plato was right [refer 
below].)  
A more destructive deconstruction would align itself with such a brave 
rationality, given that its existing modes are overly cautious, endlessly qualifying and 
nuancing (good things, to be sure), waiting for “democracies to come” that may/will 
never come. Meanwhile, the poor and brainwashed continue to suffer in silence; 
meanwhile, our dominant and domineering traditions leave behind paths of destruction and 
smoldering embers, of genocides and holocausts and a disfigured Creation. 
Given this brave and ambitious rationality, what would be the most effective 
Revolutionary government? Plato was close to the mark: philosopher-rulers – or 
something like it: a group of the world‟s wisest people drawing on the most rigorous 
philosophical resources (deconstructive, feminist, ecological, etc.‟ refer to, e.g., 
Manolopoulos, 2011: 43-44, n. 5) would form an oligarchical government – what I am 
presently calling a „Democratic Oligarchy of the Wise.‟ Decisions would usually/almost 
always be reached unanimously, given that a broader, gracious rationality would most 
likely produce unanimous decisions, though a democratic voting process would be 
available on those rarer occasions when unanimous decisions cannot be obtained due to 
the incredible complexity of certain issues.   
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Of course, there are a number of other, often-interconnected monster-traditions 
to be slain (scientism, anthropocentrism, etc.). As for the three I have singled-out here: 
the first is very close to my heart, an area of specialization for a number of years: faith; 
the second and third, which produced my initial interest in political economy via the 
„Paulitical‟ turn (Zizek, Badiou, etc.), signals a recognition of each term‟s fundamental 
entanglement with the other – and with us. (Perhaps I should end this section 
parenthetically: on the need for the obliteration of traditions with a citation and 
modification from Nietzsche: “What characterizes the free spirit is not that one‟s 
opinions are the more correct but that one has liberated oneself from tradition . . .” 
[Human, All Too Human I, section 225 (non-gender-exclusive version)]. Of course, even 
the great Nietzsche requires revision: (Only) By liberating ourselves from enslaving traditions and 
establishing enlightened traditions will our opinions and actions become more correct – and even perhaps 
true/truth.)  
 
Of Severity and Good Will  
It is my contention, therefore, that the various dominant traditions must be destroyed, 
leaving behind a path of destruction, without even smoldering embers (for they may re-
ignite), and replacing these existing oppressive traditions and institutions with 
emancipatory and progressive ones, with structures of justice and equality, egalitarian 
systems that enable the flourishing of the Earth and all its creatures. Since 
deconstruction is a progressive, enlightening force, we should harness it and any other 
rational, liberating forces. Only amongst the ruins of our monster-traditions shall 
humanity then be able to to experience the healing and transfiguration of a wounded 
planet.  
If I have been severe here with Derrida and Caputo, it is because I perceive 
some weaknesses in their arguments – fissures that are urgently in need of addressing 
and redressing, given our worsening global situation. Indeed, Derrida and Caputo 
themselves intuit and sometimes make explicit the dangerousness of deconstruction. For 
example, the word „revolution‟ is uttered twice in the same sentence by Derrida during 
the Villanova Roundtable (1997: 25). So even though he is “a very conservative person,” 
he nevertheless speaks of revolution. Furthermore, Caputo himself does not shy away 
from recurring references to a radical ethico-politics. In Caputo‟s first full-blown 
theological work, The Weakness of God, there is a number of allusions to radical 
transformation: he explicitly mentions the word „revolution‟ several times, and at other 
times he uses biblical motifs that allude to the revolutionary, such as deconstruction 
bringing a “sword” (2006: 31, 32, 34, 52). Furthermore, in After the Death of God (the very 
text where he promotes his Caputolism) and in reference to the “Kingdom of God” [sic: 
a less monarchical-patriarchal phrase would be something like “divine topos”], he speaks 
of an alternate economic dream, one which radically surpasses his uninspiring reformed 
capitalism: 
 
We can dream of the Kingdom of God on earth, which means including those who are 
out – out of power and out of luck – so that the real economic order would begin to 
reflect the sort of systematic reversals that define the Kingdom. Who belongs to the 
Kingdom? Precisely the ones who aren‟t invited to the banquet or to the wedding feast. 
The Kingdom is marked throughout by these radical reversals and privileging of the 
deprivileged (2007: 159). 
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I, too, dream this dream – but why only dream? Why not act? – or at least begin to act by 
thinking the Act? Why not destroy what needs to be destroyed? And Caputo himself 
offers a hint of at least one aspect of “the real economic order” whose construction 
would replace what we have destroyed, leaving behind non-smoldering embers: “what 
would finally be envisaged is a radical community of equals, where no one is privileged” 
(Caputo 2002: par. 33). Now, is not the dream of the divine topos on Earth akin to – or 
even the same as – the Communist Ideal? Is not Communism precisely this “radical 
community of equals”? 
One must therefore ask why Caputo alternates between his Caputolism (a 
reformed capitalism) and straight-out revolution. Whilst deconstruction enjoys 
maintaining tensions, whilst it enjoys emphasizing the undecidability that precedes and 
permeates decision, a more destructive deconstruction does not hesitate in deciding that 
what is urgently required is radical transformation. Such a destructive-constructive 
decision is informed by a variety of forces: that it is right and good and true; that 
tradition and hierarchy and exploitation have held sway for far too long; that if we do 
not act now, the various crises will only deepen and expand, with the accelerated 
disfiguration of the Earth. (And one could perhaps list several other good reasons.) 
  I have perhaps been severe here, but with Nietzsche I affirm that “to attack is 
with me a proof of good will, and sometimes of gratitude” (1976: 660) – certainly of 
good will and gratitude in this particular instance. And so, I – and perhaps others – are 
for a more destructive deconstruction, which is also and obviously constantly 
constructive and reconstructive. And if this is an invented or imagined deconstruction – 
a constructed deconstruction, one that is stronger, braver, more ruthless – so be it. So be 
it, for the sake of a weakening planet.  
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